Paul and I turned in pretty early on Day 2 and managed to make the first talk on Day 3, though not without the assistance of Club Mate and Starbucks. Day 3 was where things started to get really hairy in terms of being able to get into rooms to see the talks I wanted to see; I ended up missing the RFID talk I really wanted to see in favor of getting to the room for the Storm talk half an hour early. But that’s what conference recordings are for, isn’t it!
Continuing on from my post from a couple of days ago, here are my notes from Day 2 of the 25th Chaos Communications Congress in Berlin. I’ve been slow with getting these posted – Day 2 was December 28th. Better late than never, right?
Finally, if you’re particularly interested in anything I’ve written about, you should check out the official recordings here. Most of the talks have been posted both as direct downloads and torrents. I can’t even begin to say how amazing this is given that the conference is barely over. From what I hear as well the live streams coming from the conference while it was running were also totally solid.
And now for the actual comments about this day’s talks!
attack has been fully weaponized to USB keys (or functional iPods) and PXE boot
Jake has found a somewhat unrelated bug in Mac OSX’s Login.app which results in logged-in users’ passwords being stored in RAM; Apple is aware of the issue and not fixing it. Same for FileVault keys [o_0]
Linux dm_crypt is vulnerable
loop_aes devs thought they weren’t vulnerable because of some key-shifting stuff they do, turns out it just means that they store twice the keydata 🙂
Co-author of USENIX paper Nadia wrote an awesome keyfinding tool which can grab keys from RAM even with something like 75% corruption
Bitlocker default / simple mode is totally pwned
Even with TPM in use Bitlocker is still vulnerable if precise timings are used
My browser was behaving strangely when I tried to log in to the TD Canada Trust online banking server, so just to be paranoid I decided to change my password using another machine. I then realized that it was just me being dumb – my user agent was set to IE as I had been testing something earlier. Oops!
However, it did all lead me to discover this gemepic failboat of a password policy:
When changing your password, please remember that it must be between 5 and 8 characters in length and should contain both letters and numbers. Special characters (e.g. #, &, @) must not be used as they will not be accepted by the system. Passwords consisting of all letters or all numbers are not recommended. Although TD Canada Trust does not require you to change your password, we recommend that for security purposes you change your password every 90 days.
Okay, wtf people. 5-8 characters seems awfully permissive, and doesn’t let me put in a nice long password… but not requiring numbers and letters? Just recommending it? And their system doesn’t support punctuation in passwords? Yeesh.
It gets worse. I decided to play around with it, and was able to change my password to the following:
the first 5 characters of my bank card number (which is the username when one logs in, and is common to many TD customers).
Obviously I’ve changed the password to one which is as secure as I can make it given their crappy constraints, but it really angers me that I’m paying through the fees I pay them for this kind of asinine security policy. It almost makes me want to go through the hassle of switching banks… but I’m sure the others all have similar issues on one level or another.
Some days, though, this industry just makes me want to set things on fire – today is one of those days.